by Sundance at theconservativetreehouse.com
By now people are familiar with a New York Times (original source) story of a leak of sensitive classified information regarding U.S. operations in Ukraine and other geopolitical efforts. The New York Times was the first with the story, as shared with them by “senior Biden administration officials.”
WASHINGTON — Classified war documents detailing secret American and NATO plans for building up the Ukrainian military ahead of a planned offensive against Russian troops were posted this week on social media channels, senior Biden administration officials said. (more)
Now, let’s use this opportunity to expand our knowledge base, overlay the known frameworks that operate within our government, and simultaneously give a perspective that will not surface anywhere else.
First, the story surfaces from the New York Times. What does that tell us? It tells us the stakeholders in a background narrative surrounding the issue as constructed are domestic intelligence interests. If there was a State Dept stakeholder interest, the story would have been presented by CNN. If there was a U.S. foreign intelligence operation stakeholder interest, the story would have surfaced in the Washington Post.
The story surfaces in the New York Times, indicating a U.S. domestic intelligence interest; and the story is sourced directly to the White House via “senior Biden administration officials.” What does that mean? It means the narrative that flows from the story has a direction to shape opinion from the perspective of U.S. government domestic public relations. It means the narrative is intended to sway a domestic audience with a motive toward something else.
Secondly, and in full alignment with the first point, the centerpiece of the story is focused on a leak that surfaces in “social media.” This fits perfectly with the domestic intelligence stakeholders (DHS, National Security Council, etc). We know domestic intelligence operates in the backbone of social media platforms. An example is DHS and domestic Intelligence Community (IC) work as outlined in the Twitter files.
Put them together, a domestic IC product surfaced (being called leaked) into social media platforms containing portals controlled by domestic IC.
The domestic IC then report on the leaks to the outlet used by the domestic IC. See how these fit?
If you follow the bouncing ball, what you immediately suspect is the domestic IC planted the ‘classified information’ in the platforms they can access, then turn around and report on the leak of the classified information to media they use for domestic narrative engineering.
♦ Motive – But why would the IC plant classified information, then turn around and report on the classified information they planted? This is where you need to learn how the motives work, against a bigger picture.